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During the first week of December, President Trump convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a truce. He promised an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had carried out Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President warned, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Change of Direction

This contrast encapsulates the defining tenet of the U.S. engagement with sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a moving away from promoting democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and conflict resolution—even as this aligns with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase often repeated for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” said a top U.S. state department official on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson stated this, noting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Mixed Signals

This pivot is major, but observers note it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is influenced by the President’s direct manner, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and derogatory comments about Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” commented an analyst for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study predicts this could lead to millions of preventable deaths globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Enacting visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Apathy and Strains

Unlike his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later acknowledged using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which allocated only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable disagreement has broken out with South Africa, seemingly spurred by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Conditional Intervention

An analogous tension appeared with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This conflicted with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal appeared to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” said one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as reminiscent of that of global rivals like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“It represents a belated recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” observed one foreign policy analyst.

Realistically, the new approach likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.